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THE VIABILITY OF TRADE SECRET PROTECTION AFTER
LEAR v. ADKINS
I.

INTRODUCTION

Article I Section 8 of the United States Constitution expressly permits
patent protection for new and useful inventions.' The Patent Act 2 has
codified this constitutional mandate to give the inventor, for a limited
time, 3 an exclusive monopoly with broad power to make, use, sell or
license his patented invention. 4 The limited grant of a patent monopoly
might be considered the "price" which the public pays "to promote the
progress of science and the useful arts." 5 However, the public is reimbursed by a mandatory requirement of full disclosure on the part of the
inventor as a condition precedent to the granting of a patent. This disclosure must indicate the best method of carrying out the invention,
and enable any person skilled in the art6 to reproduce or make use of the
invention.7 As an additional protection, the patent laws mandate compliance with an intricate system of standards and prerequisites before a
patent is issued.8 Furthermore, if the patent is later invalidated, 9 the
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, provides in pertinent part that:
The Congress shall have the power . . . To promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to authors and Inventors the
exclusive right to their Respective Writings and Discoveries....
2. 35 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1964).
3. The term of a patent is seventeen years. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1964). This section
provides in pertinent part:
...
[The patentee shall have] for a term of seventeen years, the right to exclude
others from making, using, or selling the invention throughout the United
States ...
4. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1964). See note 3 supra.
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. See note 1 supra.
6. For purposes of this Comment, the term "art" may be defined as "a given
technical area."
7. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1964), provides in pertinent part:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact
:erms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with
Which it is mostly nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set
:'orth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
8. In order for an invention to be patented, it must be a "new and useful process,
machine, manufacture or composition of matter." 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1964). The invention may not be:
subject matter [that] as a whole would have been obvious at the time the
nvention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said
subject matter pertains.
35 U.S.C. § 103 (1964). See also 35 U.S.C. §§ 100-04 (1964).
9. The likelihood of a patent withstanding a challenge to its validity is not
great. In fact, in recent years, the only case in the Supreme Court where a patent
was held valid is United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966). It was aptly stated
by Mr. justice Jackson, dissenting in Jungersen v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560,
572 (1949), that:
[T]he only patent that is valid is one which this Court has not been able to get
its hands on.
Decisions of the circuit courts of appeals from January 1956 to March 1967 reveal
that plaintiffs were successful in only twenty-nine percent of the cases which involved
a determination of the patent's validity. Mahon, Trade Secrets and Patents Compared,
50 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 536, 540 (1968). See also Dearborn & Boal, Adjudications
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invention falls into the public domain and the inventor loses all right
to control its use. 10
Prior to 1964,11 the authorities were consistent in allowing an inventor
the option of either obtaining a patent or relying upon trade secret protection pursuant to statute 12 or the common law notion of the invention as
a secret.' 8 Qualification as a trade secret requires that only two basic
criteria be met: (1) some degree of novelty;14 and (2) secrecy. 15
by Circuits and Arts Involved, in R.
PRACTICE AND INVENTION MANAGEMENT

CALVERT,

THE ENCYCLOPEDIA

OF PATENT

22 (1964).

10. Once the patent has been declared invalid, the invention which has, through
disclosure, become public knowledge, is open to public use. The same is true when
the patent monopoly expires. See E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. United States,
288 F.2d 904, 911 (Ct. Cl. 1961), where it was stated that:
Information contained in a patent is public, widely distributed, and generally
known to those interested in a particular art. Inevitably the patented idea becomes
common knowledge ...
11. In 1964, the Supreme Court decided Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376
U.S. 225 (1964) and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
These cases have done much to upset the status quo of the law of unfair competition.
See pp. 556-58 infra. See generally The Supreme Court, 1963 Term, 78 HARv. L.
REv. 143, 309-12 (1964).
12. For a listing of the states which provide for statutory protection of trade
secrets and a discussion of the protection available, see R. MILGRIM, TRADE SECRETS
§ 1.10[l] at 1-40 to 1-54 (1970). For a discussion of these statutes, see Arnold,
Trade Secrets, 9 IDEA 161 (1966) ; Sutton, Trade Secret Legislation, 9 IDEA 587 (1966).
For a comparison of the judicial protection afforded trade secrets and patents,
see R. MILGRIM, supra § 8.02[8] at 8-10 to 8-11. In E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co.
v. United States, 288 F.2d 904, 911 (Ct. Cl. 1961), the court, distinguishing between
trade secrets and patents, stated:
A trade secret is any information not generally known in a trade. It may be
an unpatented invention, a formula, pattern, machine, process, customer list,
customer credit list, or even news. The information is frequently in the public
domain. Anyone is at liberty to discover a particular trade secret by any fair
means, as by experimentation ... and analysis of a particular product. Moreover,
upon discovery the idea may be used with impunity. A plurality of individual
discoverers may have protectable, wholly separate rights in the same trade secret.

13. The

RESTATEMENT OF TORTS

§ 757, comment b at 5 (1939), defines an in-

ventor's trade secret as follows:
A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity
to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it. It may be
a formula for a chemical compound, a process of manufacturing, treating or preserving materials, a pattern for a machine or other device. . . . A trade secret
is a process or device for continuous use in the operation of the business. Generally
it relates to the production of goods, as, for example, a machine or formula for
the production of an article.
Comment b also requires that the subject matter of a trade secret must contain a
substantial element of secrecy:
Matters of public knowledge or of general knowledge in an industry cannot be
appropriated by one as his secret. Matters which are completely disclosed by the
goods which one markets cannot be his secret. Substantially, a trade secret is
known only in the particular business in which it is used. It is not requisite that
only the proprietor of the business know it. He may, without losing his protection,
communicate it to employees involved in its use. He may likewise communicate it
to others pledged to secrecy. Others may also know of it independently, as, for
example, when they have discovered the process or formula by independent invention and are keeping it secret. Nevertheless, a substantial element of secrecy
must exist, so that, except by the use of improper means, there would be difficulty
in acquiring the information.

Id. at 5-6.

14. Although a trade secret must be more than a mere trivial advance in the
art, it need not approach the level of invention necessary to obtain a patent. See

Vitro Corp. of America v. Hall Chemical Co., 254 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1958) ; A.O.
Smith Corp. v. Petroleum Iron Works Co., 73 F.2d 531 (6th Cir. 1934) ; Monolith
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Therefore, in an action for trade secret misappropriation 1 the plaintiff
need only show the existence of a novel discovery, 17 its secrecy, and the
fact that the defendant had unlawfully acquired the secret and was using
it.18

Recently, however, there has been close scrutiny of the policies which
have traditionally protected trade secrets. In 1969, the Supreme Court in
Lear, Inc. v. Adkins"a considered these policies. Although the majority
opinion in Lear did not directly rule on the status of trade secret protecPortland Midwest Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 267 F. Supp. 726
(S.D. Calif. 1967), aff'd, 407 F.2d 288 (9th Cir. 1969). In Atlantic Wool Combining
Co. v. Norfolk Mills, Inc., 357 F.2d 866, 868-69 (1st Cir. 1966), the court stated:
What some other skilled person could or might have done is not controlling
in this type of case, so long as the plaintiff did in fact design for its own exclusive
use and withheld from general knowledge a new and different machine which
embodied an economically valuable advance in the art ....
In contrast, the court
below seems to have reasoned that the plaintiff's modification . . . merited protection as a trade secret only if it disclosed something very close to patentable
invention over the prior art. This was a mistaken view.
15. It is not necessary to maintain absolute secrecy. Some disclosures may be
made. However, any disclosure of a trade secret must be made in confidence and
understood to be so made. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, comment b (1939).
See also Town & Country Houses & Homes Service, Inc. v. Evans, 150 Conn. 314,
189 A.2d 390 (1963) ; Wexler v. Greenberg, 399 Pa 569 160 A.2d 430 (1960)
Vulcan Detinning Co. v. American Can Co., 72 N.J. Eq. 38, 67 A. 339 (1907).
16. Trade secrets have generally been protected under both contract and tort
theories. However, principles of agency, trust and restitution have also been employed
to protect trade secrets. Note, Trade Secret Protection of Non-Technical Competitive
Information, 54 IOWA L. REV. 1164, 1168 (1969).
Some commentators have taken the position that trade secrets are property.
See R. CALLMANN, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADEMARKS § 51 (2d ed. 1950);
1 H. Nims, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS 402 (4th ed. 1947); 5 S.
WILLISTON & G. TIHOMPSON, CONTRACTS § 1646 (rev. ed. 1937). However, others
discount this theory and regard trade secret protection as insuring commercial
morality. See, e.g., Adelman & Jaress, Inventions and the Law of Trade Secrets
After Lear v. Adkins, 16 WAYNE L. REV. 77, 84 (1969). Curiously, the leading case
in the area, E.I. duPont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100 (1917),
has been interpreted as authority for both positions. The Court stated in Masland that:
[T]he starting point for the present matter [trade secret protection] is not
property . . . but that the defendant stood in confidential relations with the
plaintiff ....
Id. at 102. Masland has been cited with approval in several cases which have characterized trade secrets as property. See, e.g., E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. United
States, 288 F.2d 904, 910, 911 (Ct. Cl. 1961) ; A.O. Smith Corp. v. Petroleum Iron
Works Co., 73 F.2d 531, 539 (6th Cir. 1934), rehearing denied, 74 F.2d 934 (6th
Cir. 1935); International Indus., Inc. v. Warren Petroleum Corp., 99 F. Supp. 907,
913 n.8 (D. Del. 1951), aff'd, 248 F.2d 696 (3d Cir. 1957), appeal dismissed, 355
U.S. 943 (1958). While there appears to be no decision citing Masland for the
proposition that trade secret protection tends to insure commercial honesty, many
authorities have adopted this position. See R. ELLIS, TRADE SECRETS § 6, at 12 (1953) ;
A. TURNER, TRADE SECRETS 12 (1962) ; Stedman, Trade Secrets, 23 OHIO ST. L.J. 4,
21 (1962). See also Franke v. Wiltschek, 209 F.2d 493, 502 (2d Cir. 1953) (Frank, J,,
dissenting).
17. In Engelhard Indus., Inc. v. Research Instrumental Corp., 324 F.2d 347
(9th Cir. 1963), the court, although holding the invention unpatentable, nevertheless
upheld plaintiff's prayer for trade secret protection. The court stated:
But to sustain Engelhard's claim for unfair competition it is only necessary that
some secret information relating to one or more essentials of the method or

apparatus invented by Hersch have been misappropriated.
Id. at 353.
18. See note 13 supra. See also Cummings, Some Aspects of Trade Secrets and
Their Protection, 54 Ky. L.J. 190 (1966) ; Mahon, supra note 9, at 541.
19. 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
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tion, the dissenting opinion raised grave doubts as to whether trade secret
protection is compatible with federal patent policy.
This Comment will explore the rationale for and against continued
protection of trade secrets and will attempt to determine the fulcrum
upon which the delicate balance between inventor's rights and federal patent laws can comfortably rest.

II. THE

APPLICABILITY OF THE

Sears-Compco

RATIONALE TO

TRADE SECRET PROTECTION

In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 20 the patentee of a floor-toceiling "pole lamp" brought a patent infringement and unfair competition
suit against a retailer who had copied and sold lamps which were substantially similar to those covered by the patent. In Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite
Liqhting Co. 21 a manufacturer of fluorescent lighting fixtures brought
suit against another such manufacturer, alleging infringement of his
design patent and unfair competition because the defendant was producing
fixtures which were substantially similar to those covered by plaintiff's
design patent. In both cases the patents involved were declared invalid.
Nonetheless, the defendants were enjoined from selling these products
on the ground that the likelihood of confusion as to the source of the
products was sufficient to make out a case of unfair competition under
applicable state law. The Supreme Court reversed, holding in both cases
that a state may not prohibit simulation of unpatentable or unpatented
articles because such prohibitions conflict with the federal patent policy
requiring full disclosure and are therefore barred by the supremacy
clause 22 of the United States Constitution.
An issue which continually arises in the aftermath of Sears and Comipco is whether an article which is not patentable or one which the inventor
has chosen not to patent is still protected from inequitable usurpation.
The conflicting considerations are that on the one hand, courts should not
condone unscrupulous business practices, but, on the other hand, one
should not be allowed to maintain a monopoly beyond the limits tolerated
23
by the patent laws.
20. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
21. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
22. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. It was stated in Sears that:
Obviously a State could not, consistently with the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, extend the life of a patent beyond its expiration date or give a patent
on an article which lacked the level of invention required for federal patents....
Just as a State cannot encroach upon the federal patent law directly, it cannot,
under some other law, such as that forbidding unfair competition, give protection
of a kind that clashes with the objectives of the federal patent laws.
376 U.S. at 231-32.
23. Some trade secrets have been maintained for periods of time which extend
far beyond the protection period granted to a patent. See Klein, The Technical Trade
Secret Quadrangle: A Survey, 55 Nw. U.L. REv. 437, 448 (1960). In the famous
"Listerine" case, Warner-Lambert Co. v. John J. Reynolds, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 655
(S.D.N.Y. 1959), plaintiff was required to pay royalties on the Listerine formula
even after the formula became public knowledge through disclosure in science journals
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The trade secret cases which have been decided subsequent to SearsCompco have done little to resolve this issue, indeed, in some instances,
24
courts have ignored the obvious applicability of those decisions. With
the exception of a Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in which a concurring judge declared that Sears-Compco precluded any protection of
trade secrets, 25 the few cases that have dealt directly with this issue have
rejected the contention that Sears-Compco governs trade secret protection. 26 In Schulenberg v. Signatrol, Inc.,2 7 and Winston Research Corp.
v. Minnesota Mining Co.28 injunctive relief and damages were granted to
employers in situations where former employees left their employ and
transmitted confidential information they had acquired to their new
employers.2 9 Both opinions distinguished Sears-Compco, reasoning that
business espionage cannot be tolerated.30 However, in Van Products Co.
v. General Welding FabricatingCo.3 1 in which the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court did not have to rule on the applicability of the Sears-Compco
doctrine since it was determined that the plaintiff had no trade secret to
protect,32 Mr. Justice Cohen, in a brief concurring opinion, reached a
contrary result by concluding that the Sears-Compco doctrine required
because the agreement between the parties made no provision for cessation of royalties

upon disclosure. For a discussion of the effect of Sears upon the law of trade secrets,
see Note, The Stiffel Doctrine and the Law of Trade Secrets, 62 Nw. U.L. REV.
956 (1968).
24. See, e.g., Bryan v. Kershaw, 366 F.2d 497 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 959 (1967) ; Van Products Co. v. General Welding & Fabricating Co., 419 Pa.
248, 213 A.2d 769 (1965). See generally Doerfer, The Limits on Trade Secret Law
Imposed by Federal Patent and Antitrust Supremacy, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1432 (1967).
25. Van Products Co. v. General Welding & Fabricating Co., 419 Pa. 248, 213
A.2d 769 (1965) (Cohen, J., concurring).
26. Winston Research Corp. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d 134, 138
(9th Cir. 1965) ; Servo Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 337 F.2d 716, 724 (4th Cir. 1964) ;
Schulenberg v. Signatrol, Inc., 33 Ill. 2d 379, 212 N.E.2d 865 (1965), cert. denied,
383 U.S. 959 (1966) ; Water Services, Inc. v. Tesco Chemicals, Inc., 410 F.2d 163
(5th Cir. 1969). In Hampton v. Blair Mfg. Co., 374 F.2d 969, 972-73 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 913 (1967), Sears-Compco was applied, not to deny trade
secret protection, but to limit the duration of the injunction.
27. 33 Ill. 2d 379, 212 N.E.2d 865 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 959 (1966).
28. 350 F.2d 134 (9th Cir. 1965).
29. In both Schulenberg and Winston, the employees formed their own company.
However, the situation where an employee discloses to a new employer the trade secret
information of his former employer is probably the most common. See Doerfer, supra
note 24, at 1435.
30. In Schulenberg, the court stated that:
[A] reading of Sears and Compco clearly indicates that they are inapposite
here. . . . No problem concerning trade secrets was present [there]. Plaintiffs
here readily concede that their finished products may be copied by legal means...
but maintain that employees in positions of confidence may not surreptitiously
copy plaintiffs' blueprints while in their employ and subsequently use them to
establish a competing business. . . . It is readily apparent that the Sears and
Compco cases do not cover a situation of industrial espionage by employees who
plan to organize a competing company and thereafter do that very thing.
33 Ill. 2d at 386, 212 N.E.2d at 868-69. The court in Winston Research, similarly
concluded that:
Unless protection is given against unauthorized disclosure of confidential business
information . . . employee-employer relationships will be demoralized . . . and
business espionage, deceit, and fraud among employers will be encouraged.
350 F.2d at 138.
31. 419 Pa.248, 213 A.2d 769 (1965).
32. See pp. 552-53 siepra.
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dismissal of every cause of action based on misappropriation of trade
secrets.Y8
It is submitted that the Sears-Compco cases are not sufficiently broad so
as to be totally conclusive of the issues presented in determining the
viability of trade secret protection. Both Sears and Compco involved
situations where the copied articles were readily obtainable by the general
public. Moreover, no particular expertise was required to simulate the
original in those cases. Finally, the issue of inequitable behavior in obtaining the design was not present in either case. Moreover, the failure
of Sears-Compco to resolve these issues would seem to mitigate its impact in the area of trade secret protection.
III. THE

DECISION IN

Lear v. Adkins

The factual situation in Lear, Inc. v. Adkins84 raises the speculation
that this case may provide the vehicle through which the question of
the current viability of trade secret protection may finally receive an
answer.
Plaintiff Adkins was employed by Lear under a contract which provided that Adkins was to have title and control over his own inventions
but would grant Lear a license on a royalty basis. In 1954 Adkins filed
a patent application for an improved gyroscope which he invented
while in Lear's employ, and drafted a license agreement covering the
gyroscope which was executed by the parties one year later. Delays
prevented the patent from issuing until 1960. However, prior to the
issuance of the patent, Adkins had left Lear's employ and Lear unilaterally terminated the license agreement, stopping royalty payments on the not
yet patented invention. Although it was held that the licensee was not
estopped from attacking the validity of his licensor's patent,3 5 the
issue which had a direct bearing on the law of trade secrets was left
unanswered by the Court. That issue is whether a contractual obligation
to pay royalties on unpatented inventions is enforceable. The Supreme
Court remanded this issue to the California state courts for study and
determination before any possible ruling3 6 could be obtained on rehearing. However, a vigorous dissenting opinion by three members of
33. Justice Cohen stated:
Two recent landmark cases [citing Sears and Compco]
the field has been pre-empted by the Federal Patent Law
of unfair competition is in conflict with the patent law
uniformity and unburdened competition relief by way of

clearly determine that
and that the state law
and in the interest of
damages or injunction

based on the state law of unfair competition may not be allowed.
419 Pa. 248, 270, 213 A.2d 769, 781 (1965) (concurring opinion).
34. 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
35. The Court also ruled that upon proof of invalidity the licensee is released from
his royalty obligation retroactively from the date of the patent. See generally Dodds,
After Lear v. Adkins - What?, 51 J. PAT. OF. Soc'Y 621 (1969).
36. It has been contended that this problem may take years and perhaps decades
to resolve in the state courts since there will be many different factual situations and,
consequently, different policy issues to be balanced. See R. MrLGRAM, supra note 12,
§ 7.08[2] at 7-70.3.
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the Court 7 argued that Adkins had absolutely no right to collect these
pre-patent royalties.
Mr. Justice Black in his dissenting opinion took the position that trade
secret protection is totally incompatible with federal patent policy. He
stated :
[T]hat no State has a right to authorize any kind of monopoly on
what is claimed to be a new invention, except when a patent has
been obtained from the Patent Office under the exacting standards

88
of the patent laws.

However, it is submitted that there is no state-created monopoly
reflected in the law of trade secrets because the inventor is protected
only for as long as his invention remains a secret. Moreover, the developer
of a trade secret receives no protection if his invention is discovered
through the independent efforts of another.8 9 Trade secret law, rather
than creating a monopoly, merely protects contractual and confidential
relationships from inequitable behavior. 40
In further support of his position Mr. Justice Black argued that:
One who makes a discovery may, of course, keep it secret if he
wishes, but private arrangements under which self-styled "inventors"
do not keep their discoveries secret, but rather disclose them, in return
for contractual payment, run counter to the plan of our patent
law s. .. ..41
It is axiomatic that freedom to contract is fundamental to the common
law of every state. Therefore, it may be argued that a contract to license
a trade secret should be valid as to the parties. Again, there is the
ever-present possibility that the secret invention may be discovered by a
third party and, since the parties to the agreement will certainly be aware
of this possibility - that others will be able to use the information without
royalty payments - it will be reflected in the negotiated price for disclosure. What, in effect, the licensee is paying for is the "headstart ' '42
over competition which the exclusive disclosure has given him. While this
rationale may be used to continue protection for trade secret licensing
agreements as between the parties to the agreement, the precepts of
federal patent policy requiring public disclosure have not been satisfied.
It is on this issue that Justice Black's vehement denial of trade secret
37. The dissent was written by Mr. Justice Black. Former Chief Justice Warren
and Mr. Justice Douglas joined in this dissenting opinion.
38. 395 U.S. at 677.
39. Among the cases recognizing this fundamental proposition are Speedry Chem.
& Prods., Inc. v. Carter's Ink Co., 306 F.2d 328, 330 (2d Cir. 1962); Grepke v.
General Electric Co., 280 F.2d 508, 512 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 899 (1960).
Moreover, if the secret is revealed by the sale of the article, the inventor loses all
rights to control and demand royalties. See Macdonald, Know-How Licensing and
the Antitrust Laws, 54 TRADEMARK REP. 251 (1964).
40. See p. 555 supra; note 16 supra.
41. 395 U.S. at 677.
42. See pp. 563-66 infra.
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protection is best appreciated. It is submitted that, despite its ominous
language, Justice Black's dissent may not envision total abolition of
trade secret law. His opinion fully recognizes that "[o1ne who makes a
discovery may, of course, keep it secret. ..

."

Justice Black's con-

tempt is reserved for situations where disclosure through commercialization
is not imminent and the inventor attempts to reap the rewards of monopoly through licensing agreements without giving the public the benefit
of eventual disclosure. 4 4 To this extent, it is posited that Justice Black
is correct.

45

The rationale of the dissent rested squarely upon Sears-Compco, citing
those cases in support of the position that states may not enforce contracts
under which an inventor can obtain payment for disclosing an unpatented
discovery.4 6 In view of the Court's generally hostile attitude toward the
rights of inventors, 4 7 and, since two of the Lear dissenters still sit on the
Court, it is conceivable that the Sears-Compco doctrine could be extended
to void contractual obligations similar to the one involved in Lear.
However, it is submitted that the facts present in Lear do not indicate
that the inventor attempted to maintain a monopoly without the promise
of eventual public disclosure 48 and therefore, Lear does not present the
49
type of situation in which protection should be precluded.
Before looking further into the policies involved in trade secret protection, the impact of Sears-Compco on an analogous area of unfair
competition should be examined.
IV.

THE

MISAPPROPRIATION

DOCTRINE

AFTER

Sears-Compco

5

Essentially, the misappropriation doctrine " provides a cause of action

against one who inequitably takes the end product of another's efforts
for his own economic benefit. This theory has been applied to protect a
variety of proprietary and quasi-proprietary interests"' against competi43. 395 U.S. at 677 (1969).
44. See p. 551 supra.
45. On the other hand, it may be argued that the inventor's rights to a trade
secret are not valid as against an independent discoverer or upon inadvertant disclosure and therefore what trade secret law protects is inequitable conduct in ascertaining the secret. Justice Black's opinion is severely criticized by R. MILGRIM, supra
note 12, § 7.08[21 at 7-70.5.
46. Mr. Justice Black argues that:
I still entertain the belief I expressed for the Court in Stiffel and Compco that
no State has a right to authorize any kind of monopoly on what is claimed to be
a new invention, except when a patent has been obtained from the Patent Office
under the exacting standards of the patent laws.
395 U.S. at 677.
47. See note 9 supra.

48. Adkins was actively seeking a patent during the period for which he alleged
the royalties from his license agreement were owed.
49. See p. 556 supra.

50. For a general discussion of the misappropriation doctrine, see Ahrens, The

Misappropriation Doctrine After Sears-Compco, 59

TRADEMARK

REP. 88

(1969).

51. See note 16 supra. The misappropriation doctrine is generally applied to
protect uncopyrighted work after there has been publication. For a discussion of the
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tors despite the absence of copyright, patent or trademark protection.
The doctrine was first added to the law of unfair competition in 1918
when the Supreme Court decided the case of International News Service
v. The Associated Press52 (INS). In INS, the Court enjoined the defendant from taking the news which the Associated Press had gathered through
its time, labor and expense and which INS had appropriated at little or
no expense to itself. The INS rule required a plaintiff to show three things:
(1) that time, effort and money has gone into the creation of the thing
misappropriated; (2) that the defendant appropriated the creation at
little cost to himself; and (3) that there will be a diversion of profits
from the plaintiff to the defendant. Subsequently, a new and distinct
facet was added to the misappropriation doctrine in Metropolitan Opera
Ass'n, Inc. v. Wagner-Nickols Recorder Corp.,53 where it was ruled that
commercial immorality could give rise to a cause of action under theories
54
of unfair competition.
Judicial determination of the effect of Sears-Compco on the misappropriation doctrine has produced two diametrically opposed results.55 One
posits that Sears-Compco precludes misappropriation actions while the
other reaffirms their viability.
In 1967, the First Circuit Court of Appeals, in Columbia Broadcasting
System v. De Costa56 (CBS), became the first court to expressly hold that
Sears-Compco overruled the INS misappropriation doctrine. In CBS, the
plaintiff was able to show conclusively that his personally created commercial identity was stolen by CBS and used as the basis for the character
Paladin in their television series "Have Gun Will Travel." However, the
court refused to grant an injunction under the misappropriation doctrine,
holding that plaintiff, not having secured copyright protection for his
characterization, had no legally protectable rights therein. The court,
while declaring that Sears and Compco took great pains to emphasize
the breadth of their position, placed great reliance upon the constitutional
rationale which protects trade secrets under the misappropriation doctrine, see
Developments in the Law - Competitive Facts, 77 HARV. L. REV. 888, 947 (1964);
Note, Protection and Use of Trade Secrets, 64 HAiv. L. REV. 976 (1951).
52. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
53. 199 Misc. 786, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. 1950), aff'd mem., 279 App.
Div. 632, 107 N.Y.S;2d 795 (1951).
54. The court in Metropolitan Opera stated that:
The modern view as to the law of unfair competition does not rest solely on the
ground of direct competitive injury, but on the broader principle that property
rights of commercial value are to be and will be protected from any form of
unfair invasion or infringement and from any form of commercial immorality,
and a court of equity will penetrate and restrain every guise resorted to by
the wrongdoer.
Id. at 792-93, 101 N.Y.S.2d at 488-89.
55. See generally Ahrens, supra note 50; Gamboni, Unfair Competition Protection After Sears and Compco, 55 TRADEMARK REP. 964 (1955).
56. 377 F.2d 315 (1st Cir. 1967). See Comment, Copyright Pre--eniption and
Character Values: The Paladin Case as an Extension of Sears and Compco, 66 MicK.
L. REV. 1018 (1968).
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policies of limiting monopoly. 57 Other courts have also concluded that
Sears-Compco renders misappropriation a dead doctrine. 58
Several jurisdictions, however, staunchly uphold the misappropriation
doctrine, thereby limiting the scope of Sears-Compco.59 Probably the most
noteworthy of these decisions have appeared in the New York courts.60
Although initially hesitant to adopt the doctrine, 6 1 both state and federal
courts 62 in New York now steadfastly support it, notwithstanding the
decisions in Sears and CoMpco.6 3 The misappropriation doctrine has been
upheld primarily upon a theory which condemns inequitable business
practices. For example, in New York World's Fair 1964-1965 Corp. v.
ColourpicturePublishers, Inc.,6 4 it was stated:

It [this decision] simply quarantines business conduct which is
abhorrent to good conscience and the most elementary principles of
law and equity. 65
Similarly, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania has also upheld the
misappropriation doctrine in a decision which recognized that unscrupu67
lous business practices cannot be tolerated.
57. The court quoted the constitutional policy to "encourage intellectual creation
by offering the creator a monopoly in return for the disclosure and eventual surrender
of his creation to the public." 377 F.2d at 319.
58. See, e.g., Cable Vision, Inc. v. KUTV, Inc., 335 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 989 (1965).

59. See, e.g., Grove Press, Inc. v. Collectors Publication, Inc., 264 F. Supp. 603

(C.D. Calif. 1967) ; Pottstown Daily News Publishing Co. v. Pottstown Broadcasting
Co., 247 F. Supp. 578 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
60. This factor will become more important when discussing the impact of Lear
on the most recent trade secret decisions. See pp. 567-69 infra.
61. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, largely due to the efforts of Judge
Learned Hand, had been reluctant to accept the misappropriation doctrine, even
though state courts in New York had continually sanctioned it. See Cheney Bros. v.
Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 297 (2d Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 281 U.S. 728 (1930).
See also G. Ricordi & Co. v. Haendler, 194 F.2d 914 (2d Cir. 1952) ; Fashion Originators Guild v. FTC, 114 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1940), aff'd on other grounds, 312 U.S.
457 (1941); RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied,
311 U.S. 712 (1940).
62. New York state law was applied in these decisions.
63. The New York state and federal courts have even extended the INS rationale
to the area of trade identity law. See Flexitized, Inc. v. National Flexitized Corp.,
335 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 913 (1965); American Safety
Table Co. v. Schreiber, 269 F.2d 255 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 915 (1959),
modified, 287 F.2d 417 (1961); Santa's Workshop, Inc. v. Sterling, 282 App. Div.
328, 122 N.Y.S.2d 488 (1953). It should be noted, that the Flexitiaed court, while
recognizing the continuing validity of the misappropriation doctrine after Sears,
applied that doctrine in a case which should have been decided on the theory of
misrepresentation. See Ahrens, supra note 50, at 97 n.27.
64. 141 U.S.P.Q. 939 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964), aff'd mem., 21 App. Div. 2d 896,
251 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1964). In the New York World's Fair case, plaintiff sought to
enjoin defendant from taking pictures of the buildings at the fair and offering them
for sale, after defendant had been refused the exclusive license to engage in these
activities.
65. Id. at 941-42.
66. Pottstown Daily News Publishing Co. v. Pottstown Broadcasting Co., 247 F.
Supp. 578 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
67. In Pottstown, the court took the position that:
[A] conscience would hardly condone such an inequitable result [allowing piracy
without giving the originator any remedy] and we, as a Court of conscience, will
not subscribe to such a conclusion unless the Supreme Court enlightens us with
a clear ruling on this specific problem.
Id. at 581.
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The continuing validity of the misappropriation doctrine even after
Sears-Compco serves to illustrate that courts are reluctant to give undue
breadth to predatory activities which grate against their conscience. 68
However, should the rationale of the dissent in Lear be adopted and trade
secret protection thereby precluded, the misappropriation doctrine will
be dealt a severe, if not fatal, blow. Trade secret protection and protection
under the misappropriation doctrine both rely upon the reluctance of
courts to condone or justify inequitable business practices. Therefore, if
a per se rule evolves from Lear to the effect that usurpation of nonpatented or copyrighted articles is legal under any circumstances, then the
misappropriation doctrine will have lost the basis for its continued
existence.
V.

THE EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP

Although the facts of Sears and Compco involve the copying of a
design by third parties, and Lear involves an employer's use of its employee's invention without compensation, most trade secret cases arise out
of a breach of confidence by an employee 9 under an express or implied

contract not to disclose, 70 or not to compete. 71 Covenants prohibiting disclosure of secret information have been upheld without question.7 2 The
existence of a written contract of this nature merely shows the specific.
intent of the parties in a situation where such disclosure would give rise
to a cause of action under the common law theories of trade secret
protection. 7 Moreover, the written agreement would most probably
define the scope of the prohibition and thereby facilitate the formulation
74
of appropriate relief.
68. Id.
69. See Blake, Employee Agreements Not To Compete, 73 HARv. L. REV. 625
(1960) ; Leydig, Protecting Trade Secrets When Employees Move, 21 Bus. LAWYER
325, 329 (1966) ; Note, supra note 16, at 1170.
70. The essential elements of an action for breach of a contract not to disclose
appear to be: (1) communication of plaintiff's knowledge to defendant under an
express or implied agreement not to disclose; and (2) use or disclosure by defendant
of the knowledge or information so obatined in violation of the confidence, to the
injury of the plaintiff. See Great Lakes Carbon Corp. v. Continental Oil Co., 219
F. Supp. 468, 498 (W.D. La. 1963) ; Kinnear-Weed Corp. v. Humble Oil & Refining
Co., 150 F. Supp. 143, 159 (E.D. Tex. 1956). Furthermore, it seems that the employee
must be cognizant that the information is indeed secret. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF AGENCY § 396(b), Comments on (b), at 16-17 (1957). In a recently reported
Pennsylvania county case, Protect Alarms, Inc. v. Ernst, 48 Pa. D. & C.2d 413
(Lehigh County C.P. 1969), it was pointed out that the only employer-employee trade
secret agreements which would be upheld are those under which the employee receives
specialized training in skills which he would not have received in the ordinary course
of employment.
71. See, e.g., Hulsenbusch v. Davidson Rubber Co., 344 F.2d 730, 736 (8th Cir.
1965) ; World Wide Pharmacal Distributing Co. v. Kolkey, 5 Ill. App. 2d 201, 125
N.E.2d 309 (1955) ; National Starch Products, Inc. v. Polymer Industries, Inc., 273
App. Div. 732, 738-39, 79 N.Y.S.2d 357, 363 (1948). See also Kessler, Contracts of
Adhesion - Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLuM. L. REV.
629 (1943).
72. See notes 73, 74 supra.
73. See Sarkes Tarzian, Inc. v. Audio Devices, Inc., 166 F. Supp. 250, 261 (S.D.
Calif. 1958). See also Note, supra note 16, at 1170.
74. See Note, supra note 16, at 1171.
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Covenants not to compete, on the other hand, have been subjected to
careful judicial scrutiny. Many jurisdictions have refused to enforce such
agreements because they were overbroad, thereby constituting an unreasonable restraint of trade. 75 Other courts will only enforce these restrictive
covenants when the employee has developed special skills by virtue of his
employment. 76 The general approach to these agreements, if there is one,
seems to be that the covenant will be decided as reasonable or unreasonable
on its face.7 7 However, under no circumstances will an employer be permitted to prohibit an employee who has left his employ from subsequently
using knowledge acquired prior to his employment 7 or expertise acquired
79
through general experience which necessarily increases skills.
It is submitted that, notwithstanding the position taken by the dissent
in Lear, restrictive agreements between an employer and an employee
should be upheld in situations where the employee was exposed to the
discoveries of others, or to developments in which he only partially
contributed to the end result. Looking at these situations from the standpoint of the misappropriation doctrine,8 0 it will be recognized that the
employer has expended time, money and effort to develop a new product
or process. The employee has taken the fruits of these expenditures
and has misappropriated them for his own use and profit, at little expense
to himself. 81 On the other hand, if the discoveries are made solely
through the efforts of one person, and that person, having decided to
work elsewhere, uses these discoveries for the benefit of his new employer,
a cause of action under the misappropriation doctrine cannot arise because
one cannot misappropriate his own efforts. 82 Moreover, his former employer still retains a "headstart"8 3 over competition as a result of the
efforts of the employee while in his employ. A good example of such a
situation occurred in Wexler v. Greenberg.8 4 In Wexler, the defendant was
plaintiff's chief chemist whose job entailed duplicating competitors'
75. See, e.g., Sonotone Corp. v. Baldwin, 227 N.C. 387, 42 S.E.2d 352 (1947)
(dictum) ; Brecher v. Brown, 235 Iowa 627, 17 N.W.2d 377 (1945). See also 5 S.
WILLISTON & G. THOMPSON, CONTRACTS §§ 1643, 1659 (Rev. ed. 1937) ; Blake, supra
note 69, at 682-84.
76. See Kings Records, Inc. v. Brown, 21 App. Div. 2d 593, 252 N.Y.S.2d 988
(1964); Harry Rogers Theatrical Enterprises, Inc. v. Comstock, 225 App. Div. 34,
232 N.Y.S. 1 (1928) ; American League Baseball Club of Chicago v. Chase, 86 Misc.
441, 149 N.Y.S. 6 (1914).
77. See 6 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1394 (1962), for citations to cases which have
decided the reasonableness of restrictive covenants on the face of the contract. See
also Note, supra note 16, at 1172 n.59.
78. See R. MILGRIM, supra note 12 § 5.02[3], at 5-13, and cases cited therein.
79. See Frederick Chusid & Co. v. Leeman, 279 F. Supp. 913 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) ;
Paramount Pad Co. v. Baumrand, 4 N.Y.2d 395, 396-97, 151 N.E.2d 609, 610, 175
N.Y.S.2d 809, 810-11 (1958) ; RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 516(f) (1932).
80. See pp. 558-61 supra.

81. See E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. American Potash & Chemical Corp.,
200 A.2d 428 (Del. Ch. 1964) ; see generally R. MILGRIM, supra note 12 §§ 5.02[31,
at 5-16 to 5-26.1.
82. It should be recognized, however, that if a licensing agreement covered these
innovations the former employer could, at present, enjoin such activity.
83. See pp. 563-66 infra.

84. 399 Pa. 569, 160 A.2d 430 (1960), noted in 74
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prodacts and improving them. When defendant took another job, plaintiff
sought to enjoin him from disclosing and using the formulas and processes
which Wexler developed while in plaintiff's employ. The court denied
the injunction, holding that the products, now being produced by defendant's new employer, were the "fruits of Greenberg's own skill as a
chemist"85 and therefore, he took nothing from his employer when he left.
VI.

TRADE SECRET PROTECTION WHEN DISCLOSURE IS
INEVITABLE -

AN INVENTOR'S HEADSTART

Often, an inventor will discover a commercially successful, though
unpatentable idea. In Sears, for example, the innovation was a new type
of lamp. The question which arises in this context is what, if any, protection should be extended to an inventor in a situation where he has
expended time and effort on an invention which he cannot patent"O and
which must be disclosed to the public before be can profit from his
discovery.
In Shellmar Products Co. v. Allen-Qualley Co.,8 7 plaintiff had disclosed its secret process and machinery for making candy wrappers to
defendant during their negotiations for a cooperative arrangement whereby
defendant would obtain a license to use plaintiff's secrets. When the
negotiations failed, defendant, on the basis of the information disclosed
during the negotiations, began producing these wrappers itself. The
court took the position that, in such a situation, any breach of confidence
would forever preclude the disclosee from adopting the secret, even when
it became public knowledge, since the disclosee, by its inequitable conduct
has precluded itself from enjoying the rights of the general public to use
the disclosure. An opposite result obtained in Conmar Products Corp.
v. Universal Slide Fastener Co. 88 where, in the same kind of situation,
the court held that once the secret becomes public, the inventor has no
remedy against the disclosee because there was no longer any secret.
Neither of these decisions appears to provide a proper and equitable
solution; Shellmar is too harsh because it places the disclosee at a great
commercial disadvantage in relation to his competitors, while Conmar
is too lenient because it gives the disclosee a competitive advantage
85. 399 Pa. at 582, 160 A.2d at 436. See also New Method Die & Cut-Out Co. v.
Milton Bradley Co., 289 Mass. 277, 194 N.E. 80, 83 (1935); National Tube Co. v.
Eastern Tube Co., 23 Ohio C.C.R. 468, 472 (1902).
86. In addition to the rigid standards for patentability imposed by the Patent
Office, a patent can only be had for an invention that falls within one of the distinct
classes listed in the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 161, 171 (1964). These classes
include machines, manufactured articles, chemical compositions, processes, ornamental
design and asexually reproduced plants. Among the kinds of inventions which have
been held to be unpatentable are the following: (1) natural principles, O'Reilly v.
Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1853) ; (2) theories of operation, De Forest Radio Co. v. General
Electric Co., 283 U.S. 664 (1931) ; and (3) methods of doing business, Hotel Security
Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 F. 467 (2d Cir. 1908). See Marmorek, The
Invento's Common-Law Rights Today, 50 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 369, 389 (1968).
87. 87 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 695 (1937).
88. 172 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1949).
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over his competitors despite his conduct. It is submitted that the proper
remedy should be a judicial determination of the extent of injunctive
relief necessary for protecting the inventor while not unduly punishing
the disclosee. The period for which the injunction should issue should
reflect the time after the invention is made public that would be required
for a competitor to put a competing product on the market. This period,
after publication and prior to the marketing of competitive goods, is the
inventor's "headstart" to which, it is submitted, he is entitled as a form of
remuneration for his efforts. A recent illustration of the propriety of such
injunctive relief is the decision in Winston Research Corp. v. Minnesota
Mining and ManufacturingCo.8 9 In that case, plaintiff had developed, over
the course of four years, a novel design for a tape recorder, which, though
apparently unpatentable, had great commercial potential. This design
was pirated by plaintiff's employees who, after forming their own corporation, were able to market a competing product before plaintiff could
take advantage of his invention. The court granted a limited injunction
precluding the employee-disclosees from deriving any benefits from
their wrongful acts until such time as competitors, who did not have
access to the trade secrets until they were publicly disclosed, could legitimately enter the market. 90 .
In Lear, the Supreme Court gave no consideration to the headstart theory, 91 thus, it is arguable that the Court's position constitutes
a sub silentio acceptance of the Conmar rationale which left the inventor
remediless.. However, since the patent system is designed to encourage
invention and promote disclosure of such inventions, 92 it is submitted
that failure to adopt the principles of Winston Research will expose the
system to serious abuses. For example, denying the inventor his "headstart" will tend to discourage experimentation which might not culminate
in a patentable invention, thereby certainly hindering most attempts at
commercial improvement. In addition, the inventor would have to be constantly vigilant lest industrial espionage robs him of the fruits of his labors.
Moreover, adherence to the Conmar rationale provides an economic advantage to those who, through chicanery, obtain advance information. If the
position of the Lear dissent is adopted by a majority of the Court, courts,
in the name of free competition, will be powerless to remedy situations such
89. 350 F.2d 134 (9th Cir. 1965).
90. The court in Winston stated that its decision:

[Dienied the employees any advantage from their faithlessness, placed . . . [the
employer] in the position it would have occupied if the breach of confidence
had not occurred prior to the public disclosure, and imposed the minimum restraint
consistent with the realization of these objectives upon the utilization of the
employees' skills.
350 F.2d at 142.
91. The only reference to the headstart theory in Lear is found in a footnote in
Justice White's concurring opinion. Mr. Justice White points out that the majority
opinion would bar post-issuance royalties that might be recoverable to the extent
that they represent payment for Lear's headstart over the rest of the industry as a
result of pre-issuance disclosure of Adkins' idea. 395 U.S. at 682 n.2.
92. See pp. 551-52 supra.
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as presented in Conmar. In sharp contrast is the Winston Research position. There are several immediate results that will obtain from this rule.
First, the public will benefit from the inventor's innovations and improvements in the product when the invention is marketed; second, since these
improvements have not been patented, once the product is in general circulation, competition is free to copy and incorporate any improvements into
their own product under the Sears-Compco doctrine; third, the inventor is
presumably garnering the economic rewards of being first on the market
with an improved product, at least until such time as competition catches
up. Finally, fundamental economics dictate that someone should benefit
when an improved product is marketed. If a trade secret theft occurs,
under Conmar, the disclosee unjustly receives the benefits derived from
his deceit, whereas the Winston Research holding protects the inventor's
interests. It seems clear that the latter position is most compatible with
the aforementioned policies of free competition. Therefore, Lear should
not be interpreted as an acceptance of Conmar, rather, no significance
should be attached to the Supreme Court's omission of the headstart
theory.
Applying this suggestion to the factual situation in Lear, the inventor,
by pursuing a patent had clearly indicated his willingness to publicly
disclose his invention. His employer (Lear) would profit from the invention by having the commercial headstart which Adkins' innovation had
provided. The public would obtain disclosure after the patent period
or, if the patent was not granted, upon marketing the gyroscope. 93 Lear
only gained the advantages of Adkins' invention by virtue of its contract 94
with him. Lear, then, is in the position of a disclosee who takes advantage of the time and efforts of an inventor and misappropriates his
invention for its own use.95
It should be noted here that some commentators have found
difficulty accepting injunctive relief as the paramount remedy in trade
secret cases. 96 Suggestions have been made that the assessment of damages
would provide a more adequate remedy to aggrieved parties and a more
93. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 230-31 (1964) ; Lear,
Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 656 (1969). In Lear, the Court stated that:
We granted certiorari in the present case, . . . in light of our recent decisions
emphasizing the strong federal policy favoring free competition in ideas which
do not merit patent protection.
395 U.S. at 656.
94. Though Adkins was employed by Lear, the terms of his contract made him
an independent contractor with respect to his inventions with Lear maintaining a
right to obtain an exclusive license on them.
95. Compare the factual situation in Lear with the discussion of the misappropriation doctrine, pp. 558-61 supra. For a discussion of the problems which arise
when an inventor discloses his idea to someone capable of putting it to practical use,
see Knoth, The Protection of Unpatented Ideas and Inventions, 32 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'Y 268 (1950).
96. See, e.g., Arnold, Problems In Trade Secret Law, in 1961 ABA PATENT,
TRADEMARK, AND COPYRIGHT LAW, SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS 248, 259 (1961). For
a discussion of the problems inherent in determining injunctive relief in trade secret
cases, see Note, Injunctions to Protect Trade Secrets -- The Goodrich and duPont
Cases, 51 VA. L. REv. 917 (1965).
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effective deterrent to potential misappropriators. 97 However, there are
few examples of the practicability of such a system, even though it might
prove a viable alternative to injunctive relief, particularly in situations such
as presented in Lear.98 However, it should be noted that the computation
of such damages is extremely speculative and therefore courts may
hesitate to adopt this remedy.
VIi.

PROTECTION WHERE THERE IS NoN-DiSCLOSURE

Absent independent discovery, there are only three ways in which a
trade secret may be disclosed: (1) by the issuance of a patent; 99 (2)
upon marketing;100 and (3) by misappropriation. 10' While tangible
products 10 2 are generally discovered by these means, many inventions
defy discovery upon mere examination of the end product. For example,
the invention of a new process for making a product would not lend itself
to discovery until such time as the inventor decides to reveal the details
of the process.' 08 These perpetual trade secrets are counter-productive
because they generally die with the inventor, thus depriving the public
04
of a valuable addition to its technology.'
The patent system, as it stands, does nothing to encourage disclosure
of such trade secrets. For example, patent protection is unobtainable if
not applied for within one year of the first commercial use of the invention. 10 5 Therefore, the mandatory disclosure provided by the patent
laws is not available unless patent protection is quickly sought. It has
been argued that when this one year period ends, so then must any protection afforded trade secrets generally because the inventor has indicated
97. For example, monetary sanctions might be imposed upon an employer who
induced a new employee to reveal trade secrets obtained by virtue of his former

employment. Arnold, supra note 96, at 257, 259-60.
98. Lear had been manufacturing Adkins' gyroscope for a few years. Therefore,
a grant of injunctive relief at this point in time would not serve to fully remunerate
Adkins because Lear's experience with the gyroscope would enable it to modify the
gyroscope to avoid infringement of Adkins' patent. Therefore, monetary damages
would seem to provide the best form of relief.
99. See, e.g., Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
100. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
101. See pp. 558-61 supra; Adelman & Jaress, supra note 16, at 91-92.
102. A "tangible" product is an invention which itself is the marketed item, e.g.,
the Sears pole lamp.
103. See Adelman & Jaress, supra note 16, at 92; Adelman, Trade Secrets and
Federal Pre-emption - The Aftermath of Sears and Cotnpco, 49 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y
713, 726 (1967).
104. For example, no one has yet been able to reproduce the violins which were
crafted by Stradivarius, nor the blue color which Della Robbia fused into his relievo
statuettes. See Marmorek, supra note 86, at 371.
105. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1964), provides in pertinent part:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a
foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year
prior to the date of the application for patent in the United States, (emphasis
added).
However, if the invention was in use for over a year but kept secret by its original
discoverer, a second discoverer may be able to patent the invention. See A. WALKER,
PATENTS

§ 66 (2d ed. A. Deller 1964).
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that he will not seek a patent and thus is unwilling to disclose his invention. 10 6 However, it is submitted that this is not a proper solution, nor
would a satisfactory result obtain if all trade secret protection were
removed for non-disclosure. First, perpetual trade secrets, by definition,
require no official protection as a prerequisite to disclosure. 10 7 Secondly,
by strict adherence to current patent law, the inventor who has implemented a trade secret for a year has no choice but to maintain the invention as a trade secret otherwise it will become public with no protections
or economic advantages available to him.' 08 It is axiomatic that one of
the basic tenets of the patent laws is to encourage disclosure and thereby
stimulate competition and free enterprise. Removing an avenue of
disclosure, indeed, in some cases discouraging it, is certainly not compatible with the overall policy of encouraging disclosure.
Reviewing the facts in Lear, a slightly different situation is revealed.
While the disclosure problem in that case was ultimately cured by the
patent grant, 109 the obvious issue raised is whether allowing an inventor
to license his trade secret is compatible with the federal disclosure
policy. 10 The difficulty with such an agreement is that it permits the
inventor to capitalize on his invention without giving the public its due,
viz. disclosure and future use."' Indeed, denial of trade secret protection
in this situation would probably serve to force the inventor to seek patent
protection because few inventors would be able to fully manufacture and
market the end product with their own resources. It is submitted that
forcing an inventor to seek a patent in order to obtain protection in this
situation is the proper channel in which to direct inventions which defy
disclosure because granting trade secret protection to this kind of invention
is fundamentally inconsistent with the overwhelming right of the public
to disclosure of inventions.
VIII.

POST Lear

DECISIONS -

THE ABSENCE OF IMPACT

The recent decision in Painton & Co., Ltd. v. Bourns, Inc. 1 2 has
provided insight into the effects of a broad interpretation of Lear upon
the licensing of trade secrets. Painton involved an agreement which, in
part, provided royalty payments on unpatented inventions. The court
106. Adelman, supra note 103, at 729-32.

107. Clearly, if an innovative idea is completely concealed by its originator, it will
be immune from discovery. Discovery results only when the inventor licenses his trade

secret or makes other commercial use of it.
108. The Patent Act recognizes, to a certain extent an inventor's right to maintain the secrecy of his invention. Since all patent applications are kept confidential
by the Patent Office until such time as the patent is granted, if the patent is not
granted, the inventor may still maintain his discovery as a trade secret. 35 U.S.C.
§ 122 (1964) ; 37 C.F.R. § 1.14(a) (Supp. 1970).

109. Once a patent issues, it is open for public examination. 37 C.F.R. § 1.11

(Supp.
. 110. 1970).
'The policy of full disclosure was fully enunciated in Scott Paper Co. v.
Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249 (1945). See Adelman, supra note 103, at 730-31.
111. See p. 556 supra.

112. 309 F. Supp. 271, 164 U.S.P.Q. 595 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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held" 8 that the enforcement of such contracts would undercut the
national patent law and policy." 4 However, in stating that:
[F]ederal patent law requires an inventor to submit his ideas to
the Patent Office before he can compel consideration for the use of
his idea." 5
the court cited no authority supporting its position. Indeed, every
authority encountered has declared the opposite." 6 The impact of Judge
Motley's decision in Painton is that one who has disclosed his unpatented
trade secret pursuant to an agreement cannot recover compensation under
such an agreement. It is submitted that this development encourages
secrecy with respect to inventions that are not unquestionably patentable.
Although the position taken by the Painton court is consistent with
Justice Black's dissent in Lear, until such time as the Supreme Court
rules on this issue, it appears that the unsubstantiated language in
Painton is, at least, premature. Moreover, the expansive position which
the New York courts have taken in the area of misappropriation,'" coupled
with the careful avoidance that other jurisdictions have demonstrated in
prophesizing the outcome of Lear,"8 support the speculation that Painton
may be reversed or affirmed upon a different basis. 119
With the noteworthy exception of the over-zealous opinion in Painton, the judicial course of trade secret protection has been unruffled by
any consideration as to what Lear might have decided. Indeed, there is
a conspicuous absence of any reference to Lear in any of the recent decisions dealing with trade secrets. 120 Plaintiffs in trade secret actions are, at
present, being denied protection when: (1) there is no secret;121 (2)
there has not been sufficient disclosure, i.e. when the invention cannot
be produced on the basis of the information given ;122 and (3) contracts
113. Judge Constance Baker Motley wrote the opinion in the Paintoncase.
114. 309 F. Supp. at 273-74, 164 U.S.P.Q. at 596.
115. Id. at 274, 164 U.S.P.Q. at 597 (emphasis added).

116. See, e.g., R. ELLIS, TRADE SECRETS 192 (1953) ; R. MILGRIM, supra note 12,

§ 8.02[1]; Marmorek, supra note 86, at 32. Professor Milgrim states:
Congress, moreover, has repeatedly recognized trade secret status as a valid
protectable right separate and distinct from patents, and has inacted numerous
statutes declaratory of its recognition and desire to protect trade secrets.
R. MILGRIM, supra note 12, § 7.08[2], at 7-69. For a discussion of the various statutes
protecting trade secrets and regulatory proceedings, see id. at §§ 6.02-6.02[8].
117. See p. 560 supra.
118. See pp. 568-69 infra.
119. The facts of the Painton case show evidence of patent misuse and illegal
tying arrangements. Upon either of these bases the decision might be affirmed.
120. With the exception of Painton and Epstein, infra note 122, there has not

been a single reported trade secret case which has relied on or even cited Lear to
preclude trade secret protection.
121. Bimba Mfg. Co. v. Starz Cylinder Co., 164 U.S.P.Q. 304 (Ill. App. 1969);
Flemming v. Ronson Corp., 107 N.J. Super. 311, 164 U.S.P.Q. 369 (N.J. Sup.
Ct. 1969).
122. Epstein v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 164 U.S.P.Q. 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). The
Epstein case is especially noteworthy since Judge Motley recognized that owners'
trade secrets could have a limited recovery in certain instances. See Fisher, Lear v.
Adkins - Enforcement of Contractual Provisions Restricting Disclosure of Confidential Information, 6 ABA LAw NoTES 115, 117-18 (July 1970).
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containing restrictive covenants which are deemed oppressive. 123 However,
124
protection is still afforded when there is evidence of misappropriation.
For example, in Cataphote Corp. v. Hudson, 25 the court assiduously protected plaintiff's secret process for the manufacture of glass beads from
misappropriation by its former employees, thereby illustrating the tendency
of courts to maintain sanctions against inequitable behavior in securing
the trade secrets developed by another.
The Cataphote court, considering the rationale for protecting trade
secrets, stated that:
Protection of trade secrets is a form of protection against use by
others,'focusing upon inequitable use by another - by breach of contract not to reveal,
or abuse of confidence, or impropriety in obtain26
ing the secret.'

An examination of these recent trade secret decisions is interesting,
not so much for the revolutionary nature of their holdings, but because
they calmly maintain the traditional concepts of trade secret protection.
These decisions, it is submitted, have placed Lear in its proper perspective
concerning trade secret issues - they have ignored it.
IX.

CONCLUSION

Any consideration of the position to be adopted with respect to protecting trade secrets requires a delicate balancing process. On the one hand
lies the inventor's right to profit from his discoveries even though they
might not be patentable. This right is deeply imbued in a capitalistic
society. Also, there is the fundamental right of persons to contract, as
well as formidable policy considerations proscribing inequitable business
behavior. Balanced against these factors are the policies which dictate
that competition should be free and open, and the theory that full dis127
closure is the quid pro quo for a government-sanctioned monopoly.
The Court in Lear recognized that a party to a contract may not
disavow that contract when he becomes dissatisfied. However, the Court
also recognized that "federal law requires that all ideas in general circulation be dedicated to the common good unless they are protected by
a valid patent.' 28 Of course, trade secret law never protected ideas in
general circulation. 12 9 Therefore, if this is the import of Lear, then
nothing is added to the law of trade secret protection as it stands. If,
however, the ultimate outcome of Lear is that federal policy precludes
123. See Central Specialties Co. v. Schaefer, 165 U.S.P.Q. 15 (N.D. Ill. 1970);
GTI Corp. v. Calhoon, 309 F. Supp. 762, 165 U.S.P.Q. 621 (S.D. Ohio 1969).

124. See Cataphote Corp. v. Hudson, 422 F.2d 1290, 165 U.S.P.Q. 41 (5th Cir.
1970) ; Heatbath Corp. v. Ifkovits, 117 Ill. App. 158, 164 U.S.P.Q. 537 (Ill. App. 1969).
125. 422 F.2d 1290, 165 U.S.P.Q. 41 (5th Cir. 1970).
126. Id. at 1293, 165 U.S.P.Q. at 43.
127. See pp. 551-52 supra.
128. 395 U.S. at 668 citing Sears and Compco (emphasis added).
129. See p. 553 supra.
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any protection of ideas which do not meet the standards of patentability,
then the full impact of Lear is yet to be realized. If this is the outcome
of Lear, any new discovery or novel idea would be "fair game" to any
unscrupulous businessman who steals it himself or entices someone to
disclose its nature.
It is submitted that, until the Supreme Court clearly resolves these
issues,180 trade secret law will maintain the "crazy quilt" pattern it
now possesses ;131 that is, with most jurisdictions upholding the validity
of traditional, common law doctrines but with others finding protection
pre-empted by Sears-Compco and Lear. However, if and when the issue
is finally resolved by the Court then it is hoped that the following results
will obtain:
8
1. The inventor's headstart will continue to be protected.

2

2. Express contractual arrangements forbidding an employee to dis88
close his employer's trade secrets will be upheld.
3. Employees will not be estopped from divulging trade secrets that
1 34
were developed through the employee's individual efforts.
4. Misappropriation of trade secrets by inequitable business methods
will continue to be restrained. 18 5
5. Inventors will be precluded from enforcing trade secret license
agreements which do not lend themselves to disclosure. 18 6
The implementation of these suggestions requires at least two specific
factual inquiries. First, a determination as to whether the secret would
eventually become public and secondly, an inquiry into the processes
which developed the alleged trade secret. These standards would provide
a more simplified guide in the resolution of the protection to be afforded
the inventor.
Barry H. Feinberg
130. See note 36 supra.
131. See pp. 567-69 supra.
132. See pp. 563-66 supra.
133. This suggestion is, of course, qualified to continue judicial scrutiny into the
degree of restraint imposed by the agreement.
134. See pp. 562-63 supra.
135. See p. 569 supra.
136. See p. 566 supra.
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